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Abstract
We present a simple proof of existence of subgame perfect equilibria
in games with perfect information.
1 Introduction
This note presents a simple proof of a theorem by Harris [4] on the existence
of subgame perfect equilibria in games of perfect information. More generally,
it illustrates a method for establishing existence of equilibria in such games,
and allows for a new characterization of equilibrium outcomes that provides
an algorithm for their computation.
The method we present consists of approximating the payoff function of
each player by a sequence of simple functions, in a way that is standard in
measure and integration theory (see, for example, Wheeden and Zygmund
[5]). The sequence of approximating payoff functions for each player, in
addition of being a sequence of simple functions, satisfies two other important
properties: first, it converges uniformly to the payoff function of that player in
the original game; and second, the approximation is such that outcomes that
are dominated according to the some payoff function in the approximating
sequence are also dominated (by the same outcome) according to the original
payoff function, and to all the subsequent payoff functions in the sequence.
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The above approximation of each player’s payoff function induces a se-
quence of games that differ from the original game only on the payoff function.
For this sequence of games, it is easy to establish that each of them has a
nonempty, compact set of equilibrium outcomes, and that the sequence of
those sets shrinks to the set of equilibrium outcomes of the original game
— thus, the original game has a nonempty, compact set of equilibrium out-
come. Furthermore, the set of equilibrium outcomes of the original game can
be computed by intersecting the corresponding sets of the approximating
games.
2 Games of Perfect Information
In order to present our argument in the simplest possible way, we will consider
only the case of games of perfect information with two players. It should be
noted that nothing in our argument depends on this assumption, and our
proof could be easily extended to the case of an arbitrary finite number of
players. Finally, using a “truncation argument” similar to the one used by
Harris [4, section 4.4, page 624] (see also Bo¨rgers [1]), one could extent our
result to the case of a denumerable number of players.
A game of perfect information (with two players) is
G = 〈Si, A2, Pi〉i=1,2 ,
where (1) Si is a nonempty set, for i = 1, 2, (2) A2 is a nonempty valued
correspondence from S1 into S2, and (3), Pi : H → R, for i = 1, 2, where
H = graph(A2).
When player 2 moves at stage 2, it is with perfect information on s1.
Hence the set of strategies of player i, i = 1, 2, is F1 = S1 and
F2 = {f2 : S1 → S2| ft(s1) ∈ A2(s1)}.
A strategy vector (f1, f2) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of G if for all
s1 ∈ S1,
f2(s1) maximizes P2(s1, ·) in A2(s1),
and
P1(f1, f2(f1)) ≥ P1(s1, f2(s1)).
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Given a game of perfect information G the vector (f1, f2(f1)) in H de-
termined uniquely by (f1, f2) is called an equilibrium path of G.
1 In what
follows we show that the existence of an equilibrium is equivalent to the
existence of an equilibrium path. Therefore, we can show that a subgame
perfect equilibrium exists by showing that an equilibrium path exists, which
is a simpler task. The reason is that, under the assumption we shall use, the
set of equilibrium paths is compact, while the set of equilibrium strategies
typically is not (see Harris [3, proposition 4]).
Define a correspondence E2 from S1 into S2 as follows:
E2(s1) = {y ∈ A2(s1) : P2(s1, y) ≥ U2(s1, s2), for all s2 ∈ A2(s1)};
this correspondence gives the equilibrium paths of the one-player game 〈A2(s1), P2〉.
The set
E1 = {(x, y) ∈ H : y ∈ E2(x) and for all s1 ∈ S1 there exists s2 ∈ E2(s1)
such that P1(x, y) ≥ P1(s1, s2)}
is then easily seen to be the set of equilibrium paths of the game G =
〈Si, A2, Pi〉i=1,2 (i.e., in the notation of footnote 1, E1 = P .)
Lemma 1 A game of perfect information has a subgame perfect equilibrium
if and only if E1 6= ∅ and E2(s1) 6= ∅, for all s1 ∈ S1.
Proof. Necessity follows from the fact that if (f1, f2) is a subgame perfect
equilibrium then (f1, f2(f1)) ∈ E1 and f2(s1) ∈ E2(s1), for all s1 ∈ S1.
For sufficiency, let (x, y) ∈ E1. Define player 1 strategy by f1 = x. For
player 2, we define f2(f1) = y. For s1 6= f1, because (x, y) = (f1, f2(f1)) ∈ E1,
it follows that there exists s2 ∈ E2(s1) such that
P1(f1, f2(f1)) ≥ P1(s1, s2);
hence we define f2(s1) = s2.
1 More precisely, the set of equilibrium paths of a game of perfect information is P =
{(x, y) ∈ H : there exists an subgame perfect equilibrium (f1, f2) such that f1 = x and
f2(f1) = y}.
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3 Approximation by Simple Functions and
Harris’ Theorem
Let G = 〈Si, A2, Pi〉i=1,2 be a game of perfect information, and assume that
for all i = 1, 2, Pi(H) ⊂ [0, 1). For i = 1, 2 and k ∈ N, let P ki : H → R be
defined by
P ki (h) =
j − 1
2k
if
j − 1
2k
≤ Pi(h) < j
2k
,
for j = 1, . . . , 2k. Define Gk =
〈
Si, A2, P
k
i
〉
i=1,2
, for all k ∈ N. We have that∣∣∣∣P ki − Pi∣∣∣∣∞ ≤ 12k , and also that P ki is a simple function; this last fact allows
us to solve the game Gk by backwards induction, and thus show that it has
a subgame perfect equilibrium. The following lemma summarizes this fact.
Lemma 2 For all k ∈ N, Gk has a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof. It follows immediately by backward induction:
Let s1 ∈ S1. Since P2 is simple, then {P2(s1, s2) : s2 ∈ A2(s1)} is finite,
and so there exists s∗2 that maximizes s2 7→ P2(s1, s2) in A(s1). Thus, define
f2(s1) = s
∗
2. This defines an optimal strategy f2 : S1 → S2 for player 2.
Similarly, since P1 is simple, then {P1(s1, f2(s1)) : s1 ∈ S1} is finite, and
so there exists s∗1 that maximizes s1 7→ P1(s1, f2(s1)) in S1. Thus, define
f1 = s
∗
1. This defines an optimal strategy f1 ∈ S1 for player 1. Clearly,
f = (f1, f2) is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
We will prove Harris’ theorem by approximating a given game G by a se-
quence of games {Gk}∞k=1 as defined above. In fact, this will be a consequence
of Theorem 1 below, which shows that the set of equilibrium outcomes of Gk
converges to the set of equilibrium outcomes of G.
Theorem 1 Let G = 〈Si, A2, Pi〉i=1,2 , be a game of perfect information.
Suppose that
1. for all i = 1, 2, Si is a compact topological space;
2. H is a closed subset of S1 × S2;
3. for all i = 1, 2, Pi is continuous;
4. A2 : S1 →→ S2 is lower hemicontinuous.
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Then, E1 = ∩∞k=1Ek1 = ∩∞k=1Ek1 and E2(s1) = ∩∞k=1Ek2 (s1) = ∩∞k=1Ek2 (s1),
for all s1 ∈ S1.
Proof. First note that because H is compact and Pi is continuous for
i = 1, 2, there is no loss in generality by assuming that Pi(H) ⊂ [0, 1), for all
i = 1, 2.
We show first that E1 ⊆ ∩∞k=1Ek1 and E2(s1) ⊆ ∩∞k=1Ek2 (s1), for all s1 ∈ S1.
This follows from the fact that for all i = 1, 2 and h, l ∈ H, Pi(h) ≥ Pi(l)
implies P ki (h) ≥ P ki (l).
We show next that ∩∞k=1Ek1 ⊆ E1. Let (x, y) ∈ ∩∞k=1Ek1 . Then, for each
k ∈ N, there a net {(xkj , ykj )}j∈Jk ⊆ Ek1 converging to (x, y).
First, we will show that y ∈ E2(x). Let s2 ∈ A2(x), k ∈ N, and {sj}j∈Jk
be such that sj ∈ A(xkj ) for all j, and sj → s2 (such net exist since A is lower
hemi-continuous). Since for all j ∈ Jk we have that ykj ∈ Ek2 (xkj ), then
P k2 (x
k
j , y
k
j ) ≥ P k2 (xkj , sj),
for all j ∈ Jk. Since
∣∣∣∣P k2 − P2∣∣∣∣∞ ≤ 12k , we obtain
P2(x
k
j , y
k
j ) ≥ P2(xkj , sj)−
2
2k
,
and so,
P2(x, y) ≥ P2(x, s2)− 2
2k
,
since P2 is continuous. Finally, letting k →∞, it follows that
P2(x, y) ≥ P2(x, s2).
Hence, it follows that y ∈ E2(x).
We are left to show that for all s1 ∈ S1 there exists s2 ∈ E2(s1) such
that P1(x, y) ≥ P1(s1, s2). Let s1 ∈ S1 and k ∈ N. For each j ∈ Jk, let
wkj ∈ Ek2 (s1) be such that
P1(x
k
j , y
k
j ) ≥ P1(s1, wkj ).
Since {wkj }j∈Jk ⊆ A2(s1), and A2(s1) is compact, we may assume that
{wkj }j∈Jk converges; let wk be such that wkj → wk. The sequence {wk}k∈N
lies also on A2(s1) and so we may again assume that it converges; let w be
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such that wk → w. An argument parallel to the one used above establishes
that
P1(x, y) ≥ P1(s1, w).
Hence, it is enough to show that w ∈ E2(s1), which can again be done with
an argument similar to the one used to show that y ∈ E2(x).
Similarly, one can show that ∩∞k=1Ek2 (s1) ⊆ E2(s1), for all s1 ∈ S1. This
completes the proof.
Theorem 1 gives a characterization of subgame perfect equilibrium paths
of G in terms of the equilibrium paths of the approximating games, and
provides an algorithm for their computation. Also, it follows immediately
from Theorem 1 that E1 and E2(s1), for all s1 ∈ S1, are compact. Also,
Harris’ Theorem follows easily from Lemma 2, and Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 (Harris) Let G be a game of perfect information. Under the
same assumptions of Theorem 1, G has a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof. For k ∈ N, let Gk be as defined above. By Lemma 2 it follows
that Ek2 (s1) is nonempty, for all s1 ∈ S1, and that Ek1 is nonempty. Since, for
all k ∈ N, i = 1, 2 and h, l ∈ H, P k+1i (h) ≥ P k+1i (l) implies P ki (h) ≥ P ki (l),
it follows that Ek+12 (s1) ⊆ Ek2 (s1), for all s1 ∈ S1 and that Ek+11 ⊆ Ek1 .
Claim 1 For all s1 ∈ S1, A2(s1) is closed.
Proof. Let {yj}j∈J be a convergent net in A2(s1) and let y ∈ S2 be such
that yj → y. Since (s1, yj) ∈ H for all j ∈ J, and H is closed, it follow that
(s1, y) ∈ H. Hence, y ∈ A2(s1).
Since for all s1 ∈ S1, A2(s1) is closed it follows that Ek2 (s1) ⊆ C2(s1), for
all k ∈ N; furthermore, for all s1 ∈ S1 and k ∈ N, Ek2 (s1) is a nonempty,
closed subset of a compact space and Ek+12 (s1) ⊆ Ek2 (s1). Hence, for all
s1 ∈ S1, ∩∞k=1Ek2 (s1) is a nonempty subset of A2(s1) (see Kelley [2, theorem
1, page 136]). Similarly, we can conclude that ∩∞k=1Ek1 is a nonempty subset
of H. Hence, it follows from Theorem 1 that E2(s1) is nonempty, for all
s1 ∈ S1, and that E1 is nonempty, which completes the proof.
Remark 1 Note that the above Theorem dispenses with the assumption used
by Harris [4] that Si, i = 1, 2, is Hausdorff.
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